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COURT REPORTS

FEDERAL COURTS
Montana v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 137 F.3d 1135 (9h
Cir. 1997) (holding Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
regulations granting treatment-as-state ("TAS") authority to the Tribe
valid and reflected appropriate delineation and application of
inherent Tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting nonmembers, and irrigation districts and irrigators who did not possess a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
had no significantly protectable interest allowing them to intervene).
The State of Montana challenged a grant by the EPA of TAS status
to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"), which allowed Tribes to establish water quality
standards ('VQS") for water located within the boundaries of the
Flathead Indian Reservation. The Tribes applied for TAS status with
respect to all surface waters within the reservation. A large lake
located within the boundaries of the reservation provided water for
domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes. The lands within the
boundaries were controlled by Tribal and non-tribal entities. The
Tribes identified several facilities on fee lands within the reservation
that could potentially impair water quality and beneficial uses of tribal
waters. These facilities included feedlots, mine tailings, dumps, and
landfills. The State alleged the regulations established by the EPA
which allowed the Tribes to exercise authority over non-members was
broader than the inherent tribal powers recognized as necessary to self
governance. The Flathead Joint Board of Control, two irrigation
districts, and four individual irrigators who owned land situated within
the boundaries of the Reservation in fee moved to intervene. The
district court denied the intervention and entered summary judgment
for the EPA and the Tribes. Montana appealed.
The EPA may treat Tribes as states for the purposes of
promulgating water quality standards under CWA § 518(e). The EPA
guidelines set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 require that (1) the Tribe be
federally recognized and exercise governmental authority; (2) the
Tribe have a governing body carrying out "substantial governmental
duties and powers"; (3) the water quality standards program which the
Tribe seeks to administer "pertain to the management and protection
of water resources ... [located] ... within the borders of an Indian
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reservation;" and (4) the Tribe reasonably expects to be capable of
carrying out the functions of an effective water quality program in a
manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the Clean Water Act
and regulations. The dispute in this case pertained to the intent of the
third requirement.
In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a Tribe
has "inherent power" to regulate the activities of non-members if the
regulated activities affect the "political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the Tribe." These potential impacts must
be serious and substantial. Generally, however, a Tribe lacks authority
over non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation. Montana
argued that the scope of inherent tribal authority was a question of law
for which EPA receives no deference. It further alleged that the EPA
committed a mistake of law in the delineation of the scope of inherent
tribal authority based on the Supreme Court's decision in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.

Although the court agreed that the EPA receives no deference in
delineation of the scope of tribal inherent authority, it did not agree
that the EPA committed any material mistakes of law in this
delineation. The EPA acted carefully in establishing its regulations. In
applying the standards of both Montana and Brendale to this case, the
EPA found that the non-member activities posed a serious and
substantial threat to Tribal health and welfare and that Tribal
regulation was essential. The court agreed and recognized that threats
to water may invoke inherent tribal authority over non-Indians.
Additionally, the court rejected the motion to intervene. It held
that since the Intervenors held a NPDES permit, the transfer of the
right to establish WQS from the state to the Tribes will have no
immediate or any foreseeable, demonstrable effect. Thus, the court of
appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Tribes.

Kimberley Crawford

Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, No. 93-654L, 1998 WL
784551 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 19, 1998) (holding no Fifth Amendment taking
of submerged land when: 1) the submerged land is subject to a United
States navigational servitude; 2) the majority of original parcel, of
which the submerged land was a part, sold for a substantial gain; and
3) the remaining non-submerged land was not restricted from all use).
In 1956, the predecessors to Palm Beach Isles Associates ("PBIA")
purchased a 311.7 acre parcel in Riviera Beach, Florida, for $380,190
that included submerged lands in Lake Worth. In 1967, PBIA applied
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for and the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") granted
a permit to dredge and fill the property located within Lake Worth.
However, PBIA did not undertake work pursuant to the permit. In
1968, PBIA sold 261 acres of the 311.7 acre parcel for approximately
$1,000,000 and retained 50.7 acres, of which 49.3 acres were
submerged lands below the mean high water mark, and 1.4 acres were
adjoining shoreline.
In 1988, PBIA filed an application with the Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation ("DER") to dredge and fill the 50.7 acres of
lake-bottom and adjoining shoreline in order to develop single family
homes.
In denying PBIA's application, DER found the proposed
development would eliminate wetlands, disrupt marine life, adversely
affect water quality and navigation of the waterway, and set a
precedent for similar development. Lake Worth is part of the Atlantic
Intracoastal Waterway, which is a federal navigational channel that
subjects submerged lands below the mean high water mark to a
The proposed
navigational servitude of the United States.
development was also contrary to public interest pursuant to Section
403.918(2) of the Florida Statutes. However, the DER, in the denial
notice, stated that a design incorporating features resulting in minimal
environmental impact such as docks and boardwalks could be
pursued.
In 1989, PBIA filed a permit application with the Corps pursuant
to section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401467 (1988) and section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1988), twenty-two years after PBIA's first permit application had
been approved. The Corps denied this application, stating that
issuance would be contrary to 404(b) (1) guidelines and public
interest, but stipulated that all viable development options of the 50.7
acre parcel had not been explored.
PBIA filed this suit for damages alleging that the Corps' denial of
PBIA's application for a permit to dredge and fill the 50.7 acre parcel
constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Both sides filed cross-motions
for summary judgment.
The court held that the United States was not obligated to
compensate PBIA for the alleged taking of the submerged 49.3 acres
because it was subject to a navigational servitude. The navigable waters
of the United States are public property and under the exclusive
control of the federal government under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. In addition, the court held PBIA's claim of
a per se taking of the remaining 1.4 acres of adjoining shoreline invalid
because the entire parcel of either 311.7 acres or 50.7 acres must be
considered for the purposes of assessing the critical property at issue.
Here, PBIA made a substantial financial gain when it sold the 261
acres in 1968 and had not been denied all beneficial use of the
remaining 1.4 acres by application denial of either the DER or the
Corps. PBIA still had the right to apply for a permit from the Corps
and a zoning variance from the state and local authorities that would
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allow water dependent uses of the parcel. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the United States.
ElaineSoltis

United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the
defendant criminally liable for violating and conspiring to violate the
Clean Water Act and other state and local laws by dumping industrial
waste from his business into storm and sewer drains).
In September 1997, a grand jury indicted the defendant, Thomas
Iverson for violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Washington
Administrative Code ('"AC"), and the City of Olympia's Municipal
Code. The prosecution charged Iverson with both violating and
conspiring to violate these laws between 1992 and 1995.
The
indictments arose out of illegal disposal of industrial waste from
Iverson's business, CH20,Inc. ("CH20").
Iverson was the company's founder and served as the president and
chairman of the board. The company blended chemicals to create
numerous products, including acid cleaners and heavy-duty alkaline
compounds. The company shipped the blended chemicals to its
customers in drums, and asked the customers to return the drums
when finished. When the drums were returned, they were often not
cleaned properly and contained a chemical residue which had to be
removed before the drum was used again.
To remove the residue, CH20 instituted a drum-cleaning
operation, which generated wastewater. On several occasions, the
defendant asked the local sewer authority if it would accept the
wastewater. However, because the metal content of the wastewater was
so high, the sewer authority refused to accept it.
Subsequently, the defendant discharged the wastewater, and
ordered his employees to discharge the wastewater, either on the
industrial plant's property, through a sewer drain at an apartment
complex the defendant owned, or through a sewer drain at the
defendant's home. He continued these discharges for about eight
years until he hired someone to dispose of the wastewater properly.
CH20 either paid a waste disposal company to dispose of the
wastewater, or shipped the drums to a professional outside contractor
for cleaning. However, these procedures cost the company thousands
of dollars each month and Iverson discontinued this program four
years later.
Shortly thereafter, Iverson bought a warehouse in Olympia and
restarted its drum-cleaning operation at the warehouse and disposed
of its wastewater through the municipal sewer. Iverson did not obtain
a permit to make these discharges. Iverson continued this method of
wastewater disposal for three years, until CH20 learned it was under
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investigation for illegal discharges of pollutants into the sewer.
The defendant had a jury trial, where they found him guilty on all
counts. The district court sentenced Iverson to one year in custody,
three years of supervised release, and a $75,000 fine. Iverson appealed
his conviction. Iverson's primary arguments were that (1) the CWA,
the WAC, and the Olympia Code, when read together, allowed his
discharges; (2) the statutes were unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the
trial court erred in formulating its "responsible corporate officer" jury
instruction. All of Iverson's claims of error relied on the premise that
the WAC and the Olympia Code allowed discharges of industrial waste
that did not affect the water. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed.
For the first issue, the defendant argued that the Olympia Code
defines "pollutant" based on the effect of the discharge. However, the
code also expressly provides that if state standards are more stringent,
then state law applies under the Olympia Code itself. Iverson argued
that state law also measures discharges based on their effect on the
water. However, the WAC lists certain discharges as always prohibited,
including a discharge into municipal sewage of substances prohibited
by the Clean Water Act. The CWA defines "pollutant" to include any
industrial waste discharged into water. Additionally, the CWA requires
publicly owned treatment works ("POTW") to create their own
regulatory programs. Authorities deem those local regulations as
pretreatment standards under the CWA. When all the CWA provisions
are read together, the CWA prohibits the discharge of any trucked or
hauled industrial waste, regardless of the effect on water, except at
discharge points designated by the POTW. The court held that the
CWA, the WAC, and the Olympia Code prohibited the discharge of
hauled or trucked industrial waste except at certain discharge points.
Regarding the vagueness challenge, Iverson argued that a conflict
in the definitions of "pollutant" in the three statutes created vagueness.
However, the court stated that a reasonable person of ordinary
intelligence would understand from reading the statutes that all three
prohibit the discharge of any hauled or trucked industrial waste except
at certain discharge points. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague
merely because it incorporates other provisions by reference. A
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would consult the
incorporated provisions.
Next, Iverson argued that a corporate officer is "responsible" only
when the officer in fact exercises control over the activity causing the
discharge. However, the CWA holds criminally liable any person who
knowingly violates its provisions. The CWA defines "person" to include
any responsible corporate officer. When Congress' intent of the
statute and the ordinary and common meaning of words are
considered, a person is a "responsible corporate officer" if the person
has authority to exercise control over the corporation's activity causing
the discharges. There is no requirement that the officer in fact
exercise such authority. Additionally, the CWA has a knowledge
requirement. A defendant must know that the substance discharged
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was a pollutant. Here, the defendant's involvement with the prior
discharges tended to prove knowledge and familiarity with the
company's industrial waste. Because Iverson was personally involved
and had authority to exercise control over the illegal discharge of
industrial waste, he was a responsible corporate officer and was
subsequently criminally liable for the company's wastewater disposal
practices.
Eric V Snyder

Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l, 3 F. Supp. 2d 815
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that summary judgment for the defendant
in a suit for contribution for response costs was proper where the
plaintiff could not prove the defendant caused the contamination, and
where the plaintiff based its theory of liability solely on speculation and
possibility).
Plaintiff, Kalamazoo River Study Group ("KRSG"), filed this suit
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA") and the Michigan Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA"). It also sought
contribution for response costs incurred in response to releases of
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") into the Kalamazoo River. KRSG
filed this suit against eight other companies with facilities on or near
the Kalamazoo River. The issue before the court was defendant
Benteler Industries, Inc.'s ("Benteler") motion for summary judgment.
Based upon studies conducted between 1972 and 1989, the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") determined
that a three mile portion of Portage Creek, from Cork Street to the
Kalamazoo River, and a thirty-five mile portion of the Kalamazoo
River, from this confluence downstream to the Allegan City Dam (the
"Site"), contained large amounts of PCBs. In 1990, the EPA listed the
Site on the National Priority List as a Superfund site pursuant to
CERCLA, and the MDNR listed the Site as an environmental
contamination site under the Michigan Environmental Response Act.
The MDNR identified three paper companies as potentially
responsible parties as a result of their past recycling operations from
1957-1971.
The recycling operations included the de-inking of
carbonless copy paper, which contained PCBs. James River Paper
Company joined HM Holdings, Inc., Georgia-Pacific Corporation, and
Simpson Plainwell Paper Company to form KRSG, an unincorporated
association. KRSG alleged that the eight other companies contributed
to PCB contamination and sought reimbursement or contribution for
their response costs.
Benteler manufactures automobile parts. Benteler purchased the
Galesburg manufacturing facility at issue in this case in 1986. The
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facility was located upstream of the Kalamazoo Superfund site, about
3,200 feet from Morrow Lake. There was a drainage ditch on
Benteler's property that ran from a headwall next to the Benteler
parking lot south, approximately 3,200 feet toward Morrow Lake.
Morrow Lake was an impoundment of the Kalamazoo River formed by
Morrow Dam. Morrow Dam was approximately 4.25 miles upstream
from the Site. When Benteler purchased the Galesburg facility, there
were transformers and capacitators in the manufacturing buildings
which contained PCBs. In the process of responding to a leak,
Benteler discovered PCBs throughout the plant, in the ditch near the
headwall, and in the drain lines leading to the ditch. In 1993, Benteler
took remedial actions to remove PCBs from the drainage ditch, and, in
1996, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality issued
Benteler a clean closure letter.
Benteler and KRSG agreed that in order to hold Benteler liable for
response costs that KRSG had and would incur at the Site, KRSG must
establish that: (1) there was a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance; (2) the site of the release or threatened release
was a "facility" as that term was defined in the statute; (3) the release
or threatened release had caused KRSG to incur response costs; and
(4) Benteler was among the statutorily-defined group of persons,
which included the owner or operator of a facility. Benteler only
challenged KRSG's ability to demonstrate the third element: i.e.,
whether PCBs from Benteler's property contributed to the
contamination of the Site.
Benteler contended that the condition of the ditch and the soil
were such that PCBs from its facility would not have migrated all the
way down the ditch to the river and that any water running in the ditch
would have been absorbed into the soil before reaching the river.
Benteler also presented evidence that they confined the PCBs in
Benteler's ditch to the area near the headwall.
The court stated that because Benteler had shown that KRSG
could not prove the causation element, the burden shifted to KRSG to
present some evidence that there was a material issue of fact that
Benteler was in fact a source of PCB contamination in the Kalamazoo
River. KRSG presented evidence based on a U.S. Geological Society
Survey Map, stormwater discharge documents showing Morrow Lake
as the discharge point for the ditch, soil samples showing PCBs at
three feet and eighteen feet from Morrow Lake, and challenges to the
conclusions of Benteler's experts.
The court held that summary judgment was appropriate because
KRSG based its entire theory of liability upon the assumption that
water flowed down the ditch to Morrow Lake. The court did not find
that KRSG had presented evidence on which a jury could reasonably
find Benteler liable because KRSG based their assumption solely on
speculation and possibility. The court stated, "[t]he existence of a
possibility does not create a material issue of fact for trial because
KRSG bears the burden of proof to show that Benteler did contribute
to PCBs in the Kalamazoo River, and not that it is possible that it might
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have contributed to the PCBs."
Finally, the court stated that "KRSG [had] utterly failed to come
forward with any evidence that would tend to show that water did in
fact flow down the ditch in sufficient quantity to carry PCBs from the
northern part of the ditch to Morrow Lake." The court reasoned that
KRSG "did not connect the dots" to show a flow of PCBs from the
Benteler facility.
Matt DiUman

STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Maricopa Superior Court, (No. CV-950161-SA) 1999 WL 4128 (Ariz. Jan. 7, 1999) (holding most of the
statutory changes at issue unconstitutional because they applied
retroactively to affect vested property rights, thus violating the due
process and separation of powers clauses of the Arizona Constitution).
The perpetual puzzle in water law: the demand for water
constantly surpasses the available supply. Priority and quantification
determinations attempt to alleviate this problem. In 1974, the Salt
River Valley Water Users' Association filed its petition for adjudication
of its water rights under A.R.S. §§ 45-231 to 45-245. (Later changed
to A.R.S. §§ 45-251 to 45-260). In 1995, the Arizona Legislature
enacted House Bills 2276 and 2193 which revised many statutes
dealing with surface water rights and the adjudication process. The
San Carlos Apache Tribe filed this special action challenging the
constitutionality of these two enactments and the Arizona Supreme
Court sitting en banc accepted jurisdiction. The court then remanded
the matter to the trial court for briefing and oral argument.
The court first analyzed House Bill 2276. The primary issue dealt
with the retroactivity of the statutory changes. All parties agreed on
the basic rule that procedural, not substantive, changes may apply
The federal parties argued the enactments were
retroactively.
unconstitutional because they consisted of substantive retroactive laws
that impaired vested property rights thereby violating substantive due
process. The state argued that all substantive changes are only
prospective and that some of those appearing retroactive were actually
clarifications of previously ambiguous law. The trial court stated, and
the Arizona Supreme Court agreed, that the statement of the
Legislature's intent in amending the adjudication process
unequivocally showed that retroactivity would apply to both substantive
and procedural changes. The court emphasized, however, that
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legislation might not disturb any vested substantive rights by
retroactively changing the law that applies to already completed
events.
Since Arizona follows the prior appropriation doctrine, it is
impermissible for subsequent legislation to change the legal effect of
acts that resulted in acquisition and priority of water rights. Thus, any
implementation of the retroactive intent to affect vested substantive
rights to water creates a due process violation. The court listed the
specific statutes in question and declared them invalid due to their
potential alteration of past events.
The second issue pertaining to House Bill 2276 was whether these
provisions also violated the separation of powers doctrine. This issue
addressed the invalidation of statutes pertaining to de minimis use, onfarm water duties, maximum capacity rules, settlement agreements,
prior filing presumptions, the role of the Arizona Department of
Water Resources, changes regarding the special master, and public
trust. The court held some of the provisions violative of separation of
powers. An equal protection question also arose within this analysis;
however, the court held that none of the statutes in question violated
equal protection principles.
The court then analyzed House Bill 2193. It recognized that the
previous analyses applied to many of these statutes, thereby
invalidating them. The court then decided to strike down the statutes
in their entirety, and let the Legislature decide whether to reenact the
provisions that satisfied constitutional requirements.

Melinda B. Barton

COLORADO
Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, No.
97SA343, slip op. at 1 (Colo. Mar. 29, 1999) (holding that volumetric
limitations will not be implied as a matter of law upon an earlier
change in use decree, fully litigated as to its terms and conditions).
The City of Golden ("Golden") applied for a change in use of its
decreed Priority 12 water rights in Clear Creek to use the water for
municipal purposes. In September 1995, several junior appropriators
in Clear Creek filed objections to the application, asserting injury to
their vested rights because Golden had expanded its water use beyond
the scope decreed.
The Clear Creek Priority 12 water right, initially decreed in
October 1884, carried an appropriation date of May 1861. The City of
Golden, appellee, and Consolidated Mutual Ditch Company
("Consolidated Mutual") are the majority holders of Priority 12 rights.
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Appellants own Clear Creek water rights junior to Priority 12. The
water court decreed Golden's share of Priority 12 water in two 1960's
proceedings. These decrees expressly quantified Golden's Priority 12
rights based on historic consumptive use. They gave Golden the right
to annually divert water up to 4.66 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s."), from
May through October. The water court required Golden to abandon
part of its flow entitlement to protect junior users. The Colorado
Supreme Court decided the existence of express flow limitations in the
1960's change decrees precluded appellants' claim. Thus, courts may
not read acre-foot volumetric limitations into Golden's Priority 12
decrees, as a matter of law.
Courts traditionally quantified Colorado water rights using a twopart measurement. First, the court determined the rate of flow
measured in cubic feet per second. Second, the court adjusted that
amount, if necessary, to account for historic consumption and the
proposed use.
The court used this method to determine the
Georgetown's 1960's decrees. Since the passage of the 1969 Water
Rights Determination and Administration Act, Colorado has been
firmly committed to the idea of using volumetric limitations in overappropriated basins. Clear Creek is such a basin. In modem change
decrees, the court generally imposed an acre-foot limitation on the
amount of water it allowed an appropriator yearly. Appellants here
urged the court to impose such an acre-foot volumetric limitation on
Golden. They argued that Golden's water engineer, Gary Thompson,
had already implied this measurement in a 1993 case involving
Consolidated Mutual.
The first change decree proceeding began in 1957 when Golden
approached James Mannon and William Vaughn, the then owners of
the Priority 12 rights, seeking to purchase them. Before sale, the
owners had the courts change their decree by changing uses from
irrigation to municipal. At the hearing, Golden's expert water
engineer, W.W. Wheeler, testified that the change in use would not
harm junior right holders. Golden would balance its municipal use to
consume an equivalent amount as that used for irrigation. Wheeler
determined that transferring 2.86 cubic feet per second to Golden
would not injure junior users. The water court denied Mannon and
Vaughn's petition. On appeal the Colorado Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case to the water court to determine whether a
change decree with limiting conditions would prevent injury to
juniors. In 1961, before the case was re-heard, the parties entered into
a court-approved consent decree.
The consent decree limited
Golden's maximum annual diversion to 2.86 cubic feet per second.
The court imposed three conditions for approval including the
removal of Mannon and Vaughn's land from irrigation, the
abandonment back to Clear Creek of .84 c.f.s., and a diversion
limitation allowing use between May and October.
Golden's second Priority 12 decree arose out of a 1964 purchase of
1.8 c.f.s. from then owners Mauz and Thuet. The second decree also
involved a change in use from agricultural irrigation to municipal
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consumption. Again W.W. Wheeler determined that transferring 1.8
c.f.s. to Golden for municipal use would not injure junior Clear Creek
appropriators. The 1964 decree contained similar conditions as the
1961 decree, including limiting Golden's diversions to the period of
May through October each year. Importantly, neither of these 1960's
decrees involved an acre-foot volumetric limitation on Golden's annual
consumption.
In 1993, Consolidated Mutual applied to change the use of its
Priority 12 rights, from agricultural to municipal use. Golden objected
arguing the change in use would injure Golden's Priority 12 rights
unless the court imposed volumetric limitations on Consolidated
Mutual's decree. By computing the average total consumptive use of
Priority 12 water at 411 acre-feet, and subtracting the amount allocated
Golden in the 1960's decrees, Gary Thompson arrived at an acre-foot
volumetric limitation on Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12. In
determining Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12, Thompson
implied Golden's remaining acre-foot share. Thompson determined
Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12 was 124 acre-feet per year,
and by implication set Golden's share of Priority 12 at 287 acre-feet per
year. It is this implied volumetric limitation of Golden's share of
Priority 12 that appellants sought to have the court read into Golden's
current change of use application.
The water court imposed
Thompson's 124 acre-feet per year volumetric limitation on
Consolidated Mutual's decree of Priority 12 in approving its change in
use application.
The current litigation began in 1995 when appellants filed claims
in District Court, Water Division No. 1, against Golden alleging the city
had infringed on their junior rights by expanding its water use beyond
that decreed in the 1960's proceedings. Appellants brought three
claims against Golden. First, due to the 1993 Consolidated Mutual
litigation and Gary Thompson's findings, these had established a 287
acre-feet per year volumetric limitation of Golden's Priority 12 rights.
Additionally, Golden's use had exceeded its 287 acre-feet per year
amount, injuring junior Clear Creek appropriators. Appellants argued
the court should read this limitation into Golden's 1960's decrees as a
matter of law. Second, appellants contended that Golden had
impermissibly expanded its use by changing its use pattern from peak
flow use to base flow use. Peak flow rights satisfy municipal demand
during the summer months, while base flow rights satisfy municipal
demand outside of the summer months. Finally, appellants alleged
Golden had impermissibly enlarged its use by increasing the lawn
acreage it irrigated with Priority 12 water.
In response, Golden filed a motion to dismiss. The city claimed
the court should bar, under claim preclusion, the modification
requested by appellants, to establish a volumetric limitation for each of
Golden's 1960's decrees of Priority 12 use. The appellants filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment arguing issue preclusion and
judicial estoppel relating to the Consolidated Mutual litigation and a
1994 report Golden filed with the State Water Commissioner
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regarding its water transfers for that year. Its 1994 transfers exceeded
Wheeler and Thompson's estimates of historic consumptive use under
the 1960's decrees. The water court denied both motions.
The water court reasoned that, after interpreting Orr v. Arapahoe
Water & Sanitation District, appellants' claims were permissible as they
were not previously litigated and asserted injury resulting from
Golden's expanded use. The water court determined that the 1960's
decrees conferred the right to change the point of diversion, and to
change the use to municipal uses, but that the decrees included an
implied volumetric limitation preventing Golden from expanding the
historical consumption of its Priority 12 rights. In denying appellants'
cross-motion for summary judgment, the water court found that Gary
Thompson's testimony in the Consolidated Mutual litigation did not
judicially estop Golden from arguing against modifying its prior
decrees to reflect volumetric limitations. The water court did not
address the appellants issue preclusion argument.
The trial began in May 1997. Expert testimony covered all three of
the appellants' claims of injury. The water court reversed its 1996
holding that Golden's change decrees were subject to implied
volumetric limitations. Contrary to its initial interpretation of Orrthat decrees are subject to implied volumetric limitations as a matter of
law-the court instead decided Orr requires courts "imply volumetric
limitations in decrees when historical consumptive use was not at issue
in an earlier proceeding." Because the parties already litigated both
the historic consumptive use and the future municipal consumptive
use associated with Golden's Priority 12 rights in the 1960's change
decree proceedings, the water court could not imply volumetric
limitations into those decrees. The court also rejected appellants'
attempts to bind Golden to Thompson's 1993 testimony with issue
preclusion and judicial estoppel.
Regarding the appellants' second claim of injury resulting from
Golden's changing its pattern of use from peak flow to base flow, the
court agreed with Thompson that there had been no change in
Golden's pattern of use in forty years. The court made no finding
regarding the third injury asserted by the appellants. They claimed
injury from Golden's increasing the total lawn acreage irrigated with
Priority 12 water. Appellants appealed the decision to the Colorado
Supreme Court.
The supreme court agreed with the water court and barred the
appellants' request that the court read the implied volumetric
limitations into the express terms of Golden's 1960's decrees under
claim preclusion. Affirming the water court's analysis of Orr, the
supreme court found that implied volumetric limitations were
developed to prevent injury to juniors when a prior change decree did
not address or contemplate the question of historic consumptive use.
The court also found support from its decision in In re Application for
Water Rights of Midway Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, about the
preclusive effect of a prior quantification of historical consumptive use
The court thus denied
on a subsequent augmentation plan.
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appellants' claim under Orr,as Golden's 1960's decrees addressed the
historic consumptive use of Priority 12 water. The supreme court
rejected appellants' motion for partial summary judgment on issue
preclusion grounds.
The court decided that the appellants' second and third claims of
injury were not precluded, and addressed each. The appellants'
second claim was that Golden had expanded its use beyond the c.f.s.
limitations decreed in the 1960s by changing its pattern of use from a
peak flow to a base flow. The court accepted the water court's factual
conclusions as sufficiently supported by the record. The water court
had relied on and accepted Gary Thompson's testimony that Golden
had not changed its pattern of use in forty years. As the water court
failed to address the appellants' third claim, regarding the increase in
law acreage irrigated by Golden's Priority 12 water, the supreme court
remanded the issue for determination of the validity of the claim.

Chip Cutler

In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause v. Brandon, 960 P.2d 672
(Colo. 1998) (holding that in setting the title for a proposed statutory
amendment, the initiative title setting board did not abuse its
discretion by omitting the definition of the term "nonexempt well,"
and that the fiscal impact statement which did not specify which
"taxpayers" a possible refund provision would effect did not mislead
voters).
The Title Initiative Setting Board ("Board") fixed a title, ballot title
and submission clause, and summary for a proposed statutory
amendment. The amendment called for the installation of water
meters by the state engineer on all wells in the unconfined aquifer in
Water Division 3, which were not exempt pursuant to Colorado
Revised Statutes § 37-92-601 and § 37-92-602. The initiative summary
included a fiscal impact statement ("Impact Statement") which
outlined the costs associated with the proposed amendment. The
Impact Statement indicated that due to state spending limits, the state
might have to refund some fee revenues generated by the initiative to
taxpayers.
Registered voters petitioned the court to review the action taken by
the Board claiming that the titles and summary misled the electorate
because the Board failed to (i) properly define the term "non-exempt"
well; and (ii) specify which taxpayers might be entitled to a tax refund,
and therefore abused its discretion.
The court explained that the scope of review in such a case is
limited to ensuring that the title, ballot title and submission clause,
and summary fairly reflect the proposed initiative in a way that does
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not mislead petition signers and voters into support for or against a
proposition by reason of the words employed by the Board.
Furthermore, the court must conduct the review with all legitimate
presumptions in favor of the Board, without addressing the merits of
the proposed legislation.
Following those standards, the court found that the Board did not
abuse its discretion in using the term "nonexempt" well without
further defining the term. The court pointed out that the actual
verbiage used in the tide and summary referred to wells not exempt
under the Colorado Revised Statutes. The court further explained
that due to potential future legislative and judicial interpretation the
Board could not define the complex definition contained in the
statutes without a detailed statutory explanation.
The court also rejected the petitioners' claim that the Impact
Statement misled voters by failing to specify which taxpayers might
receive a refund. The court noted that the initiative itself did not
include a reference to a refund. Furthermore, the Impact Statement
mentioned only a possibility of a refund, and the General Assembly
would determine the appropriateness of such an action. The court
further explained that mentioning the refund served only to promote
and clarify the statewide implications of the proposal. To that end, the
Board properly used its discretion in determining how to describe the
fiscal impact of the proposal without creating prejudice for or against
the proposal.
Stephen Lawler

Ed. note: The Colorado electorate defeated the initiative in the
November 1998 general election.

City of Lafayette v. New Anderson Ditch Co.. 962 P.2d 955 (Colo.
1998) (holding that the court will not make a conditional exchange
right absolute where the applicant does not have a legal right to use
the point of diversion identified in the proposed absolute decree).
In order to complete a large water project, the City of Lafayette
("Lafayette") acquired several water rights through agreements with
numerous entities for a right to divert water. One of the rights
included a conditional right of exchange with the Anderson Ditch,
owned by the New Anderson Ditch Company. In 1987, the water court
granted Lafayette's application for various conditional rights. Part of
the final decree included language which stated that if Lafayette had
not obtained a legal right to use the Anderson Ditch by April, 1993,
the right to this point of diversion would terminate. Subsequently,
Lafayette entered into a contract with New Anderson which permitted
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it to obtain water in exchange for an annual fee. The agreement, later
amended, continued in effect until 1994, at which time the contract
expired and Lafayette discontinued use of the diversion.
In 1993, Lafayette filed an application for determination of water
rights and requested that the court make the Anderson Ditch and four
other exchanges absolute. New Anderson opposed the application as
Lafayette failed to satisfy the condition in the 1987 decree. The water
court found that overall, Lafayette had demonstrated reasonable
diligence as to many of its exchanges and made portions of them
absolute. However, it did not grant the city an absolute right to the
Anderson Ditch, finding that Lafayette had allowed its contract to
expire. The water court held that "absent a permanent means of
transporting water, there can be no absolute water right."
Lafayette appealed the water court's judgment. It argued that
employing water for a beneficial use is the only requirement to convert
a conditional right into an absolute right. Lafayette further contended
that the water court erred when it considered the absence of
transportation facilities in its decision whether to grant an absolute
right. In its cross-appeal, New Anderson argued that the water court
erred by continuing the conditional right where the 1987 decree
required the cancellation of the exchange if Lafayette did not acquire
a legal right to use the ditch. Thus, the issue was whether Lafayette
had demonstrated reasonable diligence to allow the water court to
extend the decree for another period.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that Lafayette had
.monstrated reasonable diligence in developing its various rights and
that the water court had correctly continued the city's conditional
right to the Anderson Ditch. It further held that since Lafayette did
not have a current legal right to use the ditch, in keeping with the
terms of the 1987 decree, it was not entitled to an absolute right. The
court also agreed with Lafayette that the water court erred when it
required that a permanent means of transporting water exist in order
to perfect a right. An appropriator may arrange a legal means of
diversion that is perpetual for a term of years.
The court determined that reasonable diligence requires a
consideration of all relevant factors, including a present right and
prospective ability to use structures and facilities. It noted that
Lafayette had made consistent progress to complete the project as a
whole by working with governmental agencies, expending a large
amount of money to develop an appropriation, developing property to
be served by the water, and constructing facilities for water
transportation. The court also stated that since Lafayette had not met
the requirements of the 1987 decree, it had no legal right to the
Anderson Ditch. Therefore, consistent with the terms of the decree, it
was not entitled to an absolute decree.
The supreme court also mentioned in footnote 2 that the water
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Lafayette's claim that
stock ownership in the New Anderson Ditch created a right to operate
the exchange. The court stated that this claim was not ancillary to a
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water matter. It also noted that New Anderson was a proper party in
the proceeding despite the fact that the entity had dissolved.
Stephanie Pickens

Rice v. Brandon, 961 P.2d 1092 (Colo. 1998) (holding that ballot
initiative #105, requiring Rio Grande Water Conservation District to
make payments for benefit of public school districts, did not violate
the Colorado Constitution's single-subject requirement; titles and
summaries for three proposed initiatives (#105, #102, and #103) were
not misleading or confusing; and initiative title setting board did not
abuse its discretion in setting titles and summaries for the three ballot
initiatives).
Registered Colorado electors brought suit challenging various
actions of the Initiative Title Setting Board (the "Board"). Colorado
Constitution article V section 1 states that before an initiative is placed
on the ballot, the Board must affix a title and summary to it that
informs the voters about the initiative's purpose. The Board had
approved the titles and summaries affixed to three ballot initiativestwo statutory amendments and an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution, all up for voter approval in the 1998 election year. The
electors brought suit in an effort to keep the initiatives off the ballot,
due to their fear that the new laws' passage would adversely affect their
water rights. A common theme throughout the case was the electors'
assertion that titles and summaries affixed by the Board were
misleading because they omitted the proponents' overall scheme,
allegedly crucial to voter understanding of the initiatives.
Initiative 105 would have amended the Colorado Constitution by
adding a new section requiring that the Rio Grande Water
Conservation District pay $40 to the state per acre-foot of water
pumped from aquifers under state trust lands for use by the Closed
Basin Project. The Closed Basin is located in Colorado's San Luis
Valley, and is characterized by a sump area that collects water flowing
into the basin. The water cannot escape to the nearby Rio Grande
River due to a natural barrier at the southern boundary of the basin.
Water trapped there is lost to evaporation and evapotranspiration.
The Closed Basin Project, authorized by the Reclamation Project
Authorization Act of 1972, was designed to withdraw water from an
unconfined aquifer in the Closed Basin for delivery to the Rio Grande
River, through which it flows to New Mexico and Texas to help satisfy
Colorado's obligations under the Rio Grande Compact. The lands
under which the aquifer lies are state trust lands.
Under Colorado's Enabling Act, the legislature granted certain
public lands in trust to the people for the purpose of funding public
schools and governmental activities (e.g., erecting public buildings for
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the legislature and judiciary). Initiative 105 would have required the
Rio Grande Water Conservation District to reimburse the state for all
water it had pumped and would have pumped in the future from
beneath the state trust lands in the Closed Basin. The initiative
earmarked the money for use by public schools located in Water
Division 3.
The electors asserted that Article V section 1(5.5) prohibited the
Board from affixing a title and summary to Initiative 105 because the
initiative encompassed more than a single subject (the single-subject
requirement limits the scope of an initiative, and that scope must be
expressed in its title). The Colorado Supreme Court found that
although Initiative 105 denoted two steps for assessing and allocating
fees for water pumped from beneath the Closed Basin, the two steps
did not comprise two separate subjects.
The electors also alleged that the tides and summary were
misleading because: (1) they omitted any statement of effect on the
public school fund and Division 3 school districts; (2) the fiscal impact
statement grossly underestimated the costs of the new law to the
conservation district and failed to state which taxpayers would receive
a refund; and (3) they omitted information about the proponents
overall reasoning, crucial for voter understanding. In reviewing
whether the Board's titles and summary fairly reflected the proposed
initiative so as not to mislead petition signers and voters, the court
found that the titles and summary were not misleading because: (1)
they identified the uncertainty of the initiative's effect; (2) the fiscal
impact statement adequately described the impact on the conservation
district; and (3) the tides' and summary's failure to specify which
taxpayers would receive a refund did not render the initiative
confusing.
The two statutory amendments directly affected the Rio Grande
Water Conservation District. Initiative 102 would have required that
members of the District's board of directors be elected rather than
appointed to office. It would also have increased each director's term
from three to four years, implemented staggered terms, and imposed
specific qualifications on those seeking election. Initiative 103 would
have required the District's board of directors to refund all monies
received from court judgements during a ten year period (from 19851995)to the taxpayers. The electors asserted that the Board's titles and
summaries for these two initiatives were misleading for various reasons.
However, the court again held that the Board properly affixed the
titles and summaries.
Justice Hobbs, in his dissent, articulated the electors' concerns
about their water rights. Justice Hobbs agreed with the electors'
assertions that Initiative 105 encompassed more than a single subject,
and that the titles and summary contained a material omission
regarding the initiative's effect. Justice Hobbs found that income
generation to benefit public schools was only one purpose of the
initiative. He also found that Initiative 105 would convert a locally
owned water rights decree into a state trust asset, for the use of which
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the state could charge water appropriators a fee.
Under Colorado Constitution Article XVI, waters of natural
streams are public property subject to appropriation. Closed Basin
water was found by the water court in Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n v.
Rio Grande Water Conservation District to be within a natural surface
stream system subject to appropriation, and was so appropriated under
Water Division 3 decree W-3038. Pursuant to W-3038, the Rio Grande
Water Conservation District owned a vested property right to Closed
Basin waters. Initiative 105 would convert Closed Basin tributary water
from a vested property right into a state trust asset, for the use of which
the state could charge a fee. Justice Hobbs held that the Board's
failure to alert the voters about this conversion constituted a material
omission in its Initiative 105 summary because such conversion would
compromise Colorado's over one hundred year old constitutional and
statutory water rights acquisition scheme.
Debbie Eiland

Ed. Note: The Colorado electorate defeated all three initiatives in the
November 1998 general election.

USI Properties East, Inc. v. Simpson, 938 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1997)
(holding that the terms of stipulation among various parties
unambiguously limited the effect of the call limitation provision to
Beaver Creek, and the water court's denial of water users' motion for
declaratory judgment concerning the stipulation was not inconsistent
with the court's granting the City of Englewood's summary judgment
motion).
USI Properties East, Inc. ("USI") appealed from the water court's
decision concerning the interpretation of a stipulation regarding the
water rights between USI and the City and County of Denver
("Denver") and Climax Minerals ("Climax"). The water court had
denied USI's motion for declaratory judgment and granted summary
judgment for the city of Englewood.
In 1951, USI's predecessor in interest, Sloan, diverted water from
In 1955, Englewood
Beaver Creek to supplement ditch flow.
purchased conditional water rights on the Cabin-Meadow Creek
System, in the Fraser River Basin, and sought a point of diversion on
Beaver Creek. Subsequently, Englewood, Denver, and Climax entered
into an agreement regarding the Cabin-Meadow Creek System water.
In 1970 Englewood, due to the conditional water right, filed for a
finding of reasonable diligence. Sloan opposed the application. As a
result, Sloan, Englewood, and Climax entered into a stipulation. The
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water court approved the stipulation effective as of March 1971.
The stipulation stated that Englewood, Denver, and Climax would
not make a call on the waters of Beaver Creek to supply any of their
water right priorities in the Fraser River Basin, if the call would prevent
owners of specified water rights from making maximum use of the
water claimed under said rights. This stipulation was to apply
regardless of priority dates.
Subsequently, in 1991, Sloan sold USI certain water rights subject
to the stipulation. USI sought various changes in the point of
diversion and the place of use. As a result of the opposition to the
application, USI and Englewood entered into a stipulation regarding
diversions to particular ditches. In 1995, USI sought clarification of
the Englewood stipulation in an effort to prevent Englewood from
asserting specific water rights. The court found that the stipulation, by
its own terms, applied only to Beaver Creek and did not affect
Englewood's rights on the Fraser River.
USI sought the same clarification from the court regarding the
stipulation with Climax and Denver. It asserted that the stipulation
applied to the Fraser River as well as Beaver Creek. Adhering to basic
contract interpretation, the court found no ambiguity in the
stipulation and the plain and ordinary meaning limited the effect of
the call provision in the stipulation to the waters of Beaver Creek.
Tracy Rogers

Watson v. Vouga Reservoir Ass'n, 969 P.2d 815 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding association's assessment for restoration of reservoir outlet was
a "repair" within the meaning of the statute which allowed forfeiture of
shareholder's shares for nonpayment).
The Vouga Reservoir Association ("Association") organized under
Colorado's Ditch and Reservoir Companies statute. Plaintiff, Watson,
owned thirty-five percent of the company's shares. In 1994, the
Colorado State Engineer discovered a defect in the reservoir's outlet
pipe. After failed attempts to correct the defect, the Colorado Division
of Water Resources ordered that the Association could not store water
in the reservoir until it took appropriate remedial measures.
The majority shareholders authorized that the Association levy a
pro rata assessment on the shareholders pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §
7-42-104(1) to pay for the remedial measures, which cost in excess of
$1 million. Watson refused to pay his pro rata assessed amount, and
the Association forfeited his shares as allowed under the statute.
Watson sued to enjoin the dam repair and to dissolve and liquidate
the Association. He also alleged conversion of his shares by the
Association. Watson argued that the extent of the work constituted a
reconstruction rather than a repair authorized by the statute. The trial
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court agreed that the Association had exceeded its authority and
found the Association had committed theft and conversion of Watson's
shares.
The appellate court reviewed de novo the trial court's
interpretation of the statute. Rather than interpreting only the word
"repair," it examined the phrase of the statute which allowed
a
reservoir company "to keep its reservoir in good repair." The court
held that the meaning of the phrase was apparent on its face. The
Association existed solely to supply water for irrigation to its
shareholder's land. To fulfill its sole purpose the statute must allow
the assessment to keep the reservoir in good condition. The court
held the statute authorized the assessment, including the forfeiture of
Watson's shares.
DarrellBrown

GEORGIA
City of Centerville v. City of Warner Robins, 508 S.E.2d 161 (Ga.
1998) (upholding a consent judgment which designated to one
municipality all the service area outside another municipality's
exclusive service area).
In 1995, the Superior Court of Houston County entered a consent
order ("1995 Order") submitted by the City of Centerville
("Centerville") and consented to by the City of Warner Robins
("Warner Robins"). The 1995 Order resolved a dispute between
Centerville and Warner Robins concerning the provision of water and
sewer services. The 1995 Order designated a specific tract of land as
the exclusive water and sewer area of Centerville. All other areas
serviced by either city would continue to be served by the respective
municipality. The 1995 Order prohibited each municipality from
providing water and sewer services to areas within the exclusive service
area of the other municipality. Additionally, the 1995 Order estopped
each municipality from annexing any area within the exclusive service
area of the other municipality. In 1997, Warner Robins filed a
complaint seeking an injunction against Centerville from carrying out
plans to provide water and sewer service outside Centerville's exclusive
service area. A second order was entered in 1998 ("1998 Order") by
the superior court concluding that the original 1995 Order was a
consent agreement and that all the area outside the Centerville
exclusive service area comprised Warner Robin's exclusive service area.
Thus, the 1998 Order enjoined Centerville's plans for providing water
and sewer service. Centerville raised three issues on appeal: (1)
whether the 1995 Order was properly deemed a "consent judgment;"
(2) whether the superior court usurped control over the legislative
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function of annexation; and (3) whether the 1998 Order properly
interpreted the 1995 Order to grant all the area outside the exclusive
service of Centerville to Warner Robins.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held: (1) the 1995 Order was
properly treated as a consent judgment; (2) the superior court did not
usurp control over a legislative function; and (3) the superior court
properly interpreted the 1995 Order to designate to Warner Robins all
the area outside the exclusive service area of Centerville.
First, the court recognized that the original 1995 consent order
resulted from an affirmative act of the parties, rather than the
judgment of the court following litigation of the issues. The court
noted that a consent judgment is a voluntary stipulation by the parties
entered into in order to resolve a dispute. The 1995 Order was the
culmination of settlement efforts of Centerville and Warner Robins in
determining service areas.
Thus, the superior court properly
characterized the 1995 Order as a consentjudgment.
In deciding the second issue, the court recognized that the power
of annexation is a legislative function, not subject to control by the
judiciary. However, the superior court did not attempt to usurp
control over this function, it merely enforced the 1995 Order. In the
1995 Order, Centerville agreed not to seek annexation of property
within the Warner Robins service area. Thus, the superior court
merely sought to enforce that agreement.
Finally, the court noted that the 1995 Order failed to clearly
describe the Warner Robins service area in the same detail as it
described the Centerville service area. However, the superior court
properly used the general rules of contract construction in referring to
the record in order to construe the ambiguity. The record clearly
indicated the intent of the parties to designate to Warner Robins all
the area outside of Centerville's exclusive service area. Thus, the
superior court properly interpreted the 1995 Order.
CandaceDeen

KANSAS
Water District No. 1 v. Mission Hills Country Club, 960 P.2d 239 (Kan.
1998) (holding water district had an exclusive right under the Water
District Act to provide pressurized treated water by pipeline within the
district's boundaries and that this exclusive right did not violate the
Commerce Clause).
A privately owned Kansas Water Company ("KWC") obtained its
water supply from Kansas City, Missouri. In 1990, Water District No. 1
("District"), pursuant to the Kansas Water District Act ("Act"),
voluntarily annexed the area served by KWC. Therefore, Mission Hills
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Country Club ("Club") became subject to the District's service area.
In 1994, the District developed a new rate structure to enhance its
water supply facilities and distributions, due to the large requirements
of the Club. As a result, the Club's water bill increased dramatically.
To combat the increased rate, the Club sought alternative means of
water distribution and entered into a lower priced purchase
agreement with the water department of Kansas City, Missouri. The
Club intended to construct a private pipeline to transport the water for
its greens and fairways.
The Club notified the District of the agreement and the District
objected on the grounds that it had an exclusive right to supply treated
water to citizens within its boundaries. The Club informed the District
of its intent to disregard the rule and the District brought suit to
enjoin the Club from obtaining an alternative water source.
The issues before the Supreme Court of Kansas were: (1) whether
the District had an exclusive right under the Water District Act to
provide treated water by pipeline within the District's boundaries; and
(2) whether this exclusive right violated the Commerce Clause. The
supreme court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in
the negative.
The supreme court recognized that exclusivity in municipal
services has received judicial endorsement in Kansas. The legislature
reasoned that two water districts could not serve a territory at the same
time by adopting McQuillin Municipal Corporations §7.08:
"[I] ntolerable confusion instead of good government would obtain in
a territory in which two municipal corporations of like kind and
powers attempted to function coincidentally."
The court also focused on the phrase "supply and distribution
system" used throughout the Act in rendering its decision. A Kansas
statute, § 19-3509, provides that "the water district board shall ... have
the exclusive control of the water supply and distribution
facilities.... ." The control of water supply and distribution prohibited
any other person or entity from controlling the supply and distribution
of water. Thus, the court concluded, the Club could not use a pipeline
to bring treated water into the District's boundaries.
The Club argued that, in Kansas, utility customers are not normally
precluded from obtaining their own supply of heat, light or water for
private use. The court stated that the Club misconstrued the statute it
was asserting and that it only applied to the first part of the statute
concerning telephones, telegraphs or conveyance of oil and gas.
The Club also argued, pursuant to statute, that if a city grants a
franchise to furnish water services that the franchise cannot be
exclusive. However, the court stated that the legislature granted the
District exclusive power. As the municipality involved, the District was
a "quasi-municipal body corporate with the power of eminent
domain."
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the Kansas
Constitution does not prohibit municipalities from granting exclusive
franchises.
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In supporting its claim that the District's exclusive right violated
the Commerce Clause, the Club relied on C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Clarkstown. In Carbone,the United States Supreme Court held that an
ordinance violated the Commerce Clause because it required all incounty possessors of trash to use a specific transfer station, thus
depriving in-state and/or out-of-state processors of waste processing
and disposal business. The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished this
case from Carbone in that the District, itself, performs the entire piped
pressurized water production and delivery operation within its
boundaries; thus, it provided a municipal service.
The supreme court also relied on U.S.A. Recycling, Inc. v. Town of
Babylon. The court applied the reasoning in U.S.A. and held that in
creating the District, Kansas had not favored in-state water producers
over out-of-state competitors nor had it hindered business from
competing against a group of local proprietors. Based on this
reasoning, the supreme court found the market participant exception
inapplicable. The State of Kansas eliminated the market for piped
water when it created the District, which, in turn, fulfilled a
governmental duty. Therefore, no market existed due to the exclusive
nature of the municipal services. Furthermore, the District did not
impose any burdens on interstate commerce and arguably, the benefits
of the municipal services would outweigh any burdens that may have
been placed on interstate commerce.
Anna Litaker

MAINE
Dorey v. Spicer, 715 A.2d 182 (Me. 1998) (holding that the owner of
downstream property had no flowage rights relative to upstream dam
when: (1) he did not own lot on which dam was located; (2) the
easement he relied upon, created by conveyance of half-interest in the
sawmill, was extinguished when gristmill owner gave back that interest
to sawmill owner; (3) any appurtenant easement, created by the Mills
Act, was incapable of existence separate from the land containing the
dam).
Peter M. Dorey ("Dorey") the downstream owner of property along
Gristmill Brook ("Brook"), which originated from Foster Pond
("Pond"), filed an action naming as defendants forty-four owners of
waterfront property on the Pond. Dorey sought a declaration of his
rights to operate the Pond dam, inclusive of a right to flood the
waterfront land of the Pond. Dorey also sought an injunction stopping
any defendants from interfering with those rights. Dorey used the
connection between the original dam and the current surrounding
land rights as a basis for his claim.
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A downstream gristmill owner conveyed the land near the outlet of
the Pond to a sawmill owner in 1839. The sawmill owner constructed
the dam in question during that same year to power a sawmill
operation. At one time, the sawmill owner conveyed a one-half
interest in all his sawmill property, along with "the right to draw water
for the use of any mills," to the downstream gristmill owner. However,
the gristmill owner relinquished that one-half interest back to the
sawmill owner in 1860. As time passed, early owners divided and sold
the land surrounding the Pond to various purchasers.
Dorey
purchased most of the gristmill property, and tried to acquire the
original sawmill property, near the dam, to generate electrical power
for his residence downstream. Dorey was able to purchase only small
portions of the original sawmill land, along with "the flowage rights
relative to the sawmill lots purchased." The previous owners conveyed
the sawmill land to Dorey through a single deed, and they conveyed
the flowage rights through a separate deed, which stated that the
flowage rights would be appurtenant to the sawmill land just
purchased.
Dorey claimed a private right to operate the dam and flood the
property of upstream waterfront owners, based on the Mill Act, 38
M.R.S.A. §§ 651-59 (1989). Dorey claimed his rights under the Act by
virtue of three sources. First, Dorey claimed that he had flowage rights
to the dam because he owned the gristmill land and, at one time, the
sawmill owner gave the gristmill owner a one-half interest in the water
rights connected to the dam. Second, Dorey claimed to have flowage
rights through his ownership of part of the original mill site. Lastly,
Dorey claimed the flowage rights due to the separate deed that gave
him those rights appurtenant to the sawmill lots he had recently
purchased. Eight of the defendants moved for summary judgment,
asserting that Dorey had no flowage rights, of any kind, to the dam.
The Maine Supreme Court held that summary judgment for the
defendants was proper. The court refused to allow any of Dorey's
alleged connections to the dam's flowage rights through the Mills Act.
Under strict construction, the Act's intent was to promote the control
of water flow for early industrial uses. The Act tied the water rights
directly to the ownership of the land, in the nature of an appurtenant
easement, benefiting the mill sight as the dominant tenant.
The court reasoned that the flowage rights at issue came into
existence when the mill owner built the sawmill and dam in 1839. It
was undisputed that the sawmill was no longer operational and Dorey
did not own the dam lot. To the extent that these flowage rights still
existed, they were in the nature of an appurtenant easement to the
dam lot alone, and could not exist apart from that lot. Therefore,
since Dorey owned some land once connected to the original sawmill,
but not the dam lot, he did not possess any flowage rights. In addition,
because the flowage rights could not exist separate from the dam lot,
other owners of the sawmill lots could not convey any flowage rights by
a separate deed, as Dorey alleged.
Finally, the court held that Dorey had no flowage rights through
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the ownership of the gristmill lots. The court reasoned that when the
gristmill owner relinquished his one-half interest in the sawmill
property back to the original owner, he merged that land under a
single owner. Any flowage right to the dam that might have existed
with the gristmill property ended with that merger.
Joseph A. Dawson

MARYLAND
A. H. Smith Assoc. Ltd. Part. v. Maryland Dept. of the Env't, 695 A.2d
1252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (affirming the imposition of civil fines
for violation of consent order and wastewater discharge).
A.H. Smith Associates Limited Partnership ("Smith"), owned and
operated a sand and gravel processing facility. The facility operated by
Smith required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit for discharges of wastewater. The Maryland
Department of the Environment ("MDE") administered the NPDES
for the state of Maryland as authorized by the Environmental
Protection Agency. In March 1991, prior to the issuance of a permit,
MDE and Smith entered into a consent order allowing for the
discharge of wastewater. Both the consent order and NPDES permit
authorized the discharge of wastewater, consisting of sand and gravel,
wash water, and stormwater runoff. This discharge was subject to a
daily maximum and a monthly average maximum effluent limitation
for total suspended solids ("TSS"), and an effluent limitation on
turbidity with a daily maximum and a monthly average limit. MDE
monitored these limits once per week utilizing a grab sample. A grab
sample consists of a container filled directly from the outflow of the
source at a given point in time. During the period of the consent
order and later after issuance of the permit, MDE personnel found
numerous violations of the daily and monthly effluent limitations for
either TSS, turbidity, or both.
MDE filed suit in the circuit court for Prince George's County
seeking $297,000 in civil penalties and an injunction against further
violations of the permit. The court imposed $49,000 in fines against
Smith, but refused to issue an injunction. Smith appealed alleging:
the trial court abused its discretion in construing the consent order
and permit language in favor of MDE, thereby improperly imposing
liability; the trial court erred in concluding that the Appellant violated
both the consent order and the permit; and the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding $1,000 per violation despite clear and
uncontroverted mitigating factors in favor of MDE. Finding no error
on the part of the trial court, the appellate court affirmed.
Smith's appeal contended the state's sampling methods did not
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comply with the language of the consent order and Discharge Permit
and that a grab sample is not "any given sample representing 24-hours
flow" and, thus, is insufficient to be the basis for a finding that Smith
exceeded the effluent limitations in the consent order and permit.
The court rejected Smith's theory, noting .... "MDE would be
required to obtain an unspecified number of samples over a twentyfour hour period and then average the results obtained... this is not
what is called for under the applicable terms of the [c] onsent [o] rder
and permit." The court reasoned that under EN § 9-331(4), MDE may
require a permit holder "[t]o sample discharges in accordance with
the methods, at the locations, at the intervals, and in the manner
[MDE] requires." The MDE imposed grab samples as a requirement
upon Smith under both the consent order and permit. Smith could
only obtain the permit if it accepted those conditions, which it did.
Additionally, the court held that under the consent order, Smith
contractually agreed that grab samples would determine violations. As
to the amount of the penalty for each violation, the court found Smith
agreed to accept liability of $1,000 for each violation waiving any right
to contest the amount of the penalty. The court found no abuse of
discretion by the trial court's refusal to release Smith from its bargain.
As to permit violations, the trial court was entitled to impose fines up
to $360,000. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's consideration of three factors: (1) the amount of the penalty to
which Appellant had agreed in the consent order; (2) the factors
applicable to the imposition of fines in administrative adjudications as
set forth in EN § 9-342(b); and (3) the court's decision that it would
not impose more than one fine per day regardless of the number of
permit terms contravened on that day. The court rejected Smith's
argument that foreign courts have faced more egregious cases and
imposed lesser fines on a percentage basis.
James Fosnaught

MICHIGAN
K & K Constr., Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 575 N.W. 2d
531 (Mich. 1998) (holding that a trial court must use a balancing test
to determine whether a denial by the Department of Natural
Resources for permit to fill wetlands constitutes a categorical taking,
and must consider the property as a whole in its analysis).
J.F.K Resort Company ('JFK") owned eighty-two contiguous acres
of property divided into four parcels. Some of the parcels contained
wetlands. JFK had previously developed one of the parcels. The
remaining three undeveloped parcels were at issue in this case. K & K
Construction Company ("K & K"), as general contractor, and J.F.K., as
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owner, held a building contract on one of the three undeveloped
parcels.
Plaintiffs applied for permits to build on two separate occasions.
The first permit plan proposed to fill part of the wetlands to build a
restaurant and sports complex. The Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") denied the permit finding that Michigan's Wetland
Protection Act protected twenty-eight acres of wetlands included in the
plan.
Plaintiffs then filed the instant action without taking
administrative appeal. Plaintiffs made a second application for a
development plan that would leave most of the wetlands undeveloped.
The DNR denied the second permit application as well.
The trial court limited its takings analysis to one parcel and found
that the permit denial constituted a taking. It required the DNR to
compensate plaintiffs for loss of the full property value. The DNR
then allowed construction to begin under the second plan to mitigate
losses. Even so, the trial court held DNR liable for almost $4 million.
The court of appeals affirmed.
In its analysis, the Michigan Supreme Court first determined which
parcels of land to include in the "denominator parcel" for
consideration in the takings analysis. The trial court had only
considered one parcel. Generally, the "nonsegmentation principle"
holds that a court should consider the property as a whole in assessing
the regulation's effect on that property. The Michigan Supreme Court
held in the instant case that the takings analysis must include all three
undeveloped parcels since contiguity, common ownership, and a
common development plan bound these parcels together.
The court then discussed whether a regulatory taking had
occurred. Land use regulations may constitute a taking in two
situations.
First, a taking occurs if the regulation does not
"substantially advance a legitimate state interest." The defendants
conceded that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting and
preserving wetlands.
Second, if the regulation denied the owner all economically viable
use of his property, this may also constitute a taking. A denial of
economically viable use can constitute a taking in two different ways.
First, a categorical taking occurs if an owner was deprived of all
economically beneficial or productive use of his land. The court
found in this case that the permit denial did not render the property
economically worthless by the regulations, and thus a taking did not
occur under this analysis.
Second, a balancing test may determine whether a taking has
occurred. The court stated that the plaintiffs in this case must satisfy
this test to prove a taking had occurred. The court must consider
three factors: the character of government action; the economic effect
of the regulation; and the extent by which the regulation interfered
with investment backed expectations.
In any takings analysis based on denial of economically viable use,
the court must also compare the value of the land before and after the
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regulation. Since this court did not know the value of the three
parcels together, it remanded for consideration of the reduction in
Further, the court directed the trial court to
property value.
determine whether to include the fourth parcel in the analysis.
Shana Smilovits

MINNESOTA
Johnson v. City of Eagan, 584 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. 1998)
(municipalities cannot impose an otherwise legitimate fee to recover
public improvement costs from parties who previously received a
judicial determination that the original assessment value exceeded the
benefit a particular property received from the improvement).
In 1992, the City of Eagan authorized an improvement project,
and assessed the value of the project against the benefiting subdivision
properties. The city charged all landowners that benefited from the
improvement project based on the number of frontage feet the
benefiting property had. The Johnsons challenged the original
assessment for their property and received a judicial determination
that the amount the Johnsons were charged exceeded the benefit they
received. Accordingly, the court reduced the Johnson's fee by
approximately 50 percent.
When the Johnsons decided to connect to city water in 1996, the
city charged a standard connection fee. In addition, the city also
charged a "lateral benefit water fee" which essentially compensated the
city for the original 50 percent reduction in the special assessment.
The city only charged the "lateral benefit water fee" to those
landowners who had received judicially reduced assessments.
The Johnsons did not challenge the standard connection fee, but
contended that the additional fee was improper and requested a
refund. Although both the trial court and court of appeals believed
the additional fee was "a permissible means of recovering the full cost
of the improvement," the Minnesota Supreme Court found the
additional fee, in light of the previous judicial assessment, was an
unconstitutional taking of the Johnson's property.
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that municipalities have
the authority to levy special assessments against benefiting landowners
as a legitimate means of recovering costs for a public improvement
project. The court also recognized, however, that "[a] n assessment in
excess of the benefit conferred by the local improvement on the
property assessed is an unconstitutional taking of private property."
When an improvement's cost exceeds its benefit, "the difference must
not be borne by a particular property, but instead by the municipality
as a whole."
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Addressing the city's contention that Minnesota statutes allow it to
recover costs through use, availability, or connection charges, taxes, or
special assessments, the court stated that this authority is limited. Both
the Johnsons and the court recognized that a city has the power to
collect improvement costs via availability or connection charges,
special assessments, or taxes. A municipality is not allowed, however,
to recover judicially disallowed fees through an otherwise legitimate
exercise of its authority. The court noted that "such a charge is
impermissible if it is imposed discriminatorily as a way of subverting [a
reduction or avoidance of an assessment]."
Because the "lateral benefit fee" was assessed against only those
landowners that received judicially reduced assessments, the court
determined that the fee in this case was an improper special
assessment.
The court held that "this fee constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of private property and is impermissible
regardless of whether the recoupment effort is under the guise of an
assessment or a connection charge." Accordingly, the Johnsons
received a refund for the amount that exceeded the previous judicial
decree.
MichaelFischer

NEW HAMPSHIRE
Greenan v. Lobban, 717 A.2d 989 (N.H. 1998) (holding that grantor
intended to convey title of land extending to lake's shore line and that
non-riparians did not gain right-of-way to the beach outside of
delineated boundaries by a prescriptive or a deeded right-of-way).
Defendant owned riparian lots on Newfound Lake ("Lake") in
Bridgewater, New Hampshire. The plaintiffs owned non-riparian lots
with ten-foot-wide right-of-way easements for access to the Lake's
beach. The plaintiffs used the beach in front of and near the right-ofway for forty years. Beginning in the 1980s the defendants asked the
plaintiffs to restrict their use to the area inside the right-of-way's
boundaries. Because the plaintiffs refused, the defendants constructed
barriers and posted "no trespassing" signs on either side of the right of
way.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants to quiet title claiming deeded
and prescriptive rights to use the beach up to the natural high water
mark. The lower court rejected the plaintiffs' contention and ruled
that the defendants owned the beach to the high water line and owned
exclusive littoral rights to the water and lakebed. However, the court
found that the location of the plaintiffs' deeded right-of-way extended
beyond the delineated boundaries; thus, the plaintiffs could traverse
additional land.
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Both parties appealed the superior court ruling. The plaintiffs
challenged the court's finding that the defendants' property extended
to the high water mark. The defendants challenged the location of
the plaintiffs' deeded right-of-way.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the superior court
ruling that the defendants' property extended to the high water mark.
Because the grantor worded the defendants' deed ambiguously, the
Court used extrinsic evidence to find the grantor's intent. The
defendants introduced, and the court accepted, a letter from the
grantor's attorney that stated that the grantor intended to convey
complete title extending to the shore. Further, the supreme court
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they owned the land by
prescription by finding that the defendants permitted the plaintiffs to
use the beach; thus, the plaintiffs did not satisfy prescription's adverse
element.
Additionally, the supreme court overturned the superior court
ruling concerning the location of the plaintiffs deeded right-of-way.
The supreme court found that the ruling of the lower court
contradicted the deed's plain language because it created a right-ofway that bisected the defendants' properties. Both the defendants' and
the plaintiffs' deeds dictated that the right-of-way separated the
defendants' properties.
Madoline Wallace

OHIO
Long Beach Association, Inc. v. Jones, 697 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio 1998)
(holding that a plat for a block containing a lagoon did not create a
separate subdivision which would prevent owners of lots in other
blocks of the subdivision from using the lagoon).
In 1923, the Long Beach Company ("Company") submitted a plat
for subdivision. It included blocks A, B, and C. The Company
subdivided only blocks A and C into lots at this time. The Company
did not subdivide Block B, situated between blocks A and C, into lots
until the Company submitted a separate plat in 1927. The 1927 plat,
entitled "Long Beach Subdivision of Block B," stated that Lot E, which
included a lagoon and private lane, "[was] for the use of lot owners
within the subdivision." The appellants purchased lots in Block B and
contended that the language in the plat dedication supported the
claim that the lagoon was for the exclusive use of the residents of
Block B. The trial court dismissed all of the appellants' claims. Upon
appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in
dismissing the counterclaims of trespass, conversion, and unjust
enrichment, and affirmed summary judgment on the claim of

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Additionally, the court of
appeals held that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 1927
plat and found in favor of the appellants as to the meaning of the
language in the plat.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the wording in the 1927 plat
was clear and unambiguous in stating that all residents of the Long
Beach subdivision had use of the lagoon, which included the residents
of Blocks A, B, and C. The court noted that where terms in an existing
contract are clear and unambiguous, the court could not in effect
create a new contract by finding an intent not expressed in the clear
language employed by the parties. Applying this principle, the court
concluded that if the drafters intended to delineate an entirely new
subdivision, they would have done so by eliminating any reference to it
as being a part of the general subdivision. Furthermore, the court
concluded that the language in the plat clearly established Block B as
part of the general subdivision. The court rejected the appellants'
argument that there was any language to indicate an intent to remove
Block B from the general subdivision, which would give exclusive use
of the lagoon to residents of Block B. Therefore, the use of the private
lane and the lagoon were not exclusive to the residents of Block B.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeal's decision
and reinstated the trial court's judgment.
Lori Asher

PENNSYLVANIA
Adams Sanitation Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 715 A.2d 390
(Pa. 1998) (holding that the Department of Environmental Protection
is permitted to order an owner or occupier of land to remedy a
contaminated condition, regardless of fault or knowledge).
Adams Sanitation Company ("ACS") entered into a lease with
Netta S. Deatrick to operate a sanitary landfill on a 108 acre parcel
and, in 1979, obtained a permit from the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP") allowing it to dispose of solid waste
on the site. In October of 1983, Keystone Sanitation Company
("Keystone") acquired ASC's assets, name, tradename, lease rights, and
obligations to Deatrick. In November, 1983, Keystone assigned its
rights and obligations under this lease to its new, wholly owned
subsidiary, known as Adams Sanitation Company, Inc. ("Subsidiary").
At that time, ASC had filled seventy-eight acres of the 108 acre parcel
of land. The Subsidiary applied and received a permit from DEP
allowing it to fill the remaining thirty acres. DEP notified the
Subsidiary that it was responsible for the water supply contamination
on a residential tract of land adjacent to the seventy-eight acre site
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previously filled by ASC.
DEP directed the Subsidiary to provide a replacement water supply
to the residence according to Section 1104(a) of the Municipal Waste
Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.1104(a)
and to develop and implement a program to abate groundwater
contamination emanating from the landfill pursuant to Sections 104
and 602 of the Solid Waste Management Act, Sections 5, 316 and 610
of the Clean Streams Law, and Section 1917-A of the Administrative
Code.
Subsidiary appealed to the Environmental Hearing Board
("EHB"). EHB granted partial summary judgment in favor of DEP.
Subsidiary was directed to restore and replace the water supply, and
comply with DEP's order to submit and implement a groundwater
abatement program. Subsidiary then appealed to the commonwealth
court, which affirmed EHB'sjudgment.
The issue was whether a party who leases a parcel of land for the
operation of a business could be required to abate groundwater
contamination pursuant to Section 316 of the Clean Streams Law
where the record failed to demonstrate that the party either caused or
knew of the contamination. The court held that Section 316 of the
Clean Streams Law allows the DEP to order either the owner or the
occupier of land to correct the condition caused by pollution,
regardless of that party's fault in causing the contamination. The clear
and plain language of Section 316 does not require the DEP to prove
that an owner or occupier of land either knew or should have known
of the existence of the pollution before requiring that party to correct
the condition caused by the contamination.
The court found this construction of Section 316 in accord with
the General Assembly's stated objective in Section 4 of the Clean
Streams Law-that clean, unpolluted streams are absolutely essential
to attract business, to attract tourists, for recreational purposes, and "to
prevent further pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth...
[and] ...to reclaim and restore to a clean, unpolluted condition every
stream in Pennsylvania ......
The court rejected Subsidiary's argument that a party is only liable
for the water pollution it either caused or knew to exist before leasing
or operating on the property. Rather, it found that this interpretation
would undermine the DEP's efforts to achieve the legislature's
mandate set forth under 35 P.S. § 691.4 because it would require the
DEP to conduct an extensive investigation into the cause of the
pollution, before ordering remediation of the polluted site. This
extensive investigation would delay the clean up of the water and cause
the polluted condition to increase while the DEP searched for the
party that caused the pollution.
The court further found a tenant has a proprietary interest in the
land at common law. Here, Subsidiary occupied and had a proprietary
interest in the contaminated site. Therefore, the court permitted the
DEP to order Subsidiary under Section 316 to correct the condition
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without having to prove that Subsidiary caused or knew of the
pollution.
The court also rejected Subsidiary's argument that this was an
abuse of the state's police powers. The court held Subsidiary failed to
explain or demonstrate that the DEP's directive would have a severe
economic impact on its business, or that the directive was a physical
intrusion by the government.
Melody Divine

WASHINGTON
Ravenscroft v. Washington Water Power Co., 969 P.2d 75 (Wash. 1998)
(holding that submerged tree stumps which caused plaintiffs injuries
while boating were "artificial" within the meaning of the applicable
statute as a matter of law, but whether stumps represented a "latent"
condition was a question for the trier of fact).
To increase the production of electricity from Long Lake Dam, the
Washington Water Power Company ("WWP") raised the level of water
in Long Lake Reservoir over a period of years. Raising the water level
submerged the bases of trees around the perimeter of the lake. WWP
removed the trees but left their stumps, which, when WWP holds the
reservoir at maximum level, lie below the surface of the water. While
boating on Long Lake Reservoir, the plaintiff was injured when his
motor hit one of the submerged tree stumps. The stump flipped the
motor into the boat, striking the plaintiff in the head and shoulders.
The Washington Supreme Court's analysis turned upon the
Washington recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.200-.210. Washington's
Revised Code 4.24.210 exempts landowners from liability for injuries
sustained by the public while recreating on the landowner's property
except where the injury stems from a "known dangerous artificial
latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously
posted."
The purpose of the statute is to encourage landowners to hold
their property open to the public for recreational purposes without
the fear of liability. A landowner's potential for liability is narrow-it
applies only to specific, limited conditions over which the landowner
presumably has more control.
The issues in this case pertaining to the first defendant, WWP, were
whether the stumps created an "artificial" and "latent" condition as a
matter of law, thereby supporting summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. The court held that the condition was artificial due to the
"man-made change in the natural condition of the water channel ....
"
The court reasoned WWP created the injury-causing condition by
cutting dead trees down, leaving their stumps near the middle of the
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water channel, raising the level of water covering the stumps, and
failing to place buoys where the stumps remained. The court
reasoned that human effort creates an "artificial" condition.
"Latent," as defined by Washington case law, means "not readily
apparent to the recreational user." An additional inquiry is whether
the injury-causing condition is "readily apparent to the general class of
recreational users, not whether one user might fail to discover it." The
court held the record inconclusive about the latency of the tree
stumps; thus, the issue was a matter of fact precluding summary
judgment.
The dissent disagreed with the court's interpretation of "artificial."
The dissent stated that the purpose of the statute combined with the
statutory language and previous case law dictate that "artificial" should
be construed narrowly; thus, the majority's definition was overbroad
and contrary to the purpose of the statute. The dissent also attacked
the majority's latency analysis.
Against the second defendant, the County of Spokane, the plaintiff
challenged the public duty doctrine's barring of his claim that he was a
third party beneficiary of a funding agreement between the County
and the State Parks and Recreation Commission. In Washington, the
public duty doctrine bars negligence claims by individuals against a
governmental entity absent clear statutory legislative intent to identify
and protect a "particular and circumscribed class of persons"- the
"legislative intent exception." The intent to protect a specific group
must be clearly expressed; it will not be implied. The exception allows
a plaintiff to bring a claim against the governmental entity for statute
violation if the plaintiff can show his or her membership in the clearly
identified class.
Here, the plaintiff argued that an agreement between State Parks
and the County made pursuant to the state boating safety grants and
contracts program defined the duty of the County toward recreational
boaters thereby creating a specific class apart from the public at large.
The court held that the County, in the agreement, did not assume
responsibilities beyond those existing in statutory and tort law;
therefore, the public duty doctrine barred the plaintiffs claim.
Amy Beatie

Wedden H v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998) (holding
that an ordinance banning personal watercraft is not in conflict with
other state law, and does not violate county's police powers or
substantive due process).
After reviewing the negative effects of motorized personal
watercraft (essentially 'jet skis" or "PWCs") on marine life and tourism,
San Juan County passed an ordinance banning the use of them "on all

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 2

waters of San Juan County" and "on Sportsman Lake" in the county.
This case presented an appeal from the decision by the trial court that
held the ordinance void. The standard under which the Washington
Supreme Court reviewed the case was de novo. The court made its
decision in response to three issues: whether the ordinance was in
conflict with other state law; "[wa]s an unreasonable exercise of [the
county's] police power," therefore violating the Washington State
Constitution; and whether it violated substantive due process.
In analyzing whether the ordinance violated the Washington
Constitution, the court first considered whether the ordinance
conflicted with other state law. The respondents claimed the
ordinance conflicted with the state boat permitting law and public
trust doctrine, specifically the Shoreline Management Act ("SMA")
and the Marine Recreation Land Act. The court held that the permit
law merely stated a "precondition to operating a boat" in Washington
by requiring a permit, and did not create "an unabridged right to
operate PWC in all waters throughout the state." Next, the court
found the ordinance consistent with the policy of the SMA since it
"favors 'the resources and ecology of the shoreline; over recreational
interests.'
Finally, respondents claimed a violation of the Marine Recreation
Land Act ("Act") because as a recipient of funds created by the Act
through fuel taxing on boats, San Juan County "must keep [their]
facilities open to 'all motorized vessels."' The court dismissed this
claim based on findings that while the language of the county's
agreement with the interagency committee for outdoor recreation
(established by the Act to distribute funds) provided that facilities will
"be kept open for public use," there was no language prohibiting the
county from "restrict[ing] the manner in which the public uses the
facilities."
A two-part test determined "the validity of a statute passed
pursuant to police power."
The court looked at whether the
ordinance "promote [d] the health, safety, peace, education, or welfare
of the people" and if it bore "some reasonable relationship to
accomplishing" the statute's underlying purpose.
Since the
ordinance's language conveyed an intent to protect the safety of other
boats, swimmers and wildlife of the area, the court concluded the first
part of the test met. Respondents took issue with the ban as an
inappropriate means to the ordinance's end. They claimed mere
public displeasure with PWC might not dictate the county's action, and
that the ordinance extended beyond local boundaries, affecting PWC
users and retailers outside of SanJuan County.
The court responded to these points by looking at the inadequacy
of existing noise regulations, the evidence of aquatic damage unique
to PWCs, and bans on PWCs in other jurisdictions "held reasonable."
In finding the ordinance "purely local," the court utilized a hunting
analogy: "[a] ban on hunting within a city is a valid exercise of the
police power." Since the ordinance only affects PWC activity within
San Juan County, and does not "preclude [county] residents from
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using PWC outside the County, nor does it regulate activities beyond
geographical limits," the court found the ordinance within county
police powers.
An "unduly oppressive" test determined violations of substantive
due process, and the court balanced the "public's interest against
those ... regulated." The court held that "[i]t defies logic to suggest
an ordinance is unduly oppressive when it only regulates the activity
which is directly responsible for the harm." Since PWCs directly
caused the harm to the public and environmental problems cited in
the evidence presented at trial, and their owners" are not being forced
to bear a financial burden or solve a societal problem not created by
PWC," the ordinance cannot be found unduly oppressive.
Jennifer Lee

DiBlasi v. City of Seattle, 969 P.2d 10 (Wash. 1998) (holding a
municipality liable for damages to adjacent landowner's property
caused by surface water that collected, channeled, and thrust onto the
property from a public street).
In 1924, a real estate developer dedicated certain roadways to the
City of Seattle ("City") for public use. The dedication also granted the
City the right to slope the original grading of the streets for cut or fills.
In 1975, Patricia DiBlasi, the plaintiff, built her house on the downhill
slope of 38" Street near the edge of a ravine. The developer allegedly
filled the ravine to extend 38" Street. Consequently, the City installed
a berm to stop surface water from running onto 38" Street. However,
in the spring of 1991, the City removed the berm when it resurfaced at
nearby Barton Street. Local residents and hydrology experts stated
that the removal doubled the amount of water flowing over 38"' Street.
This tore the street apart. After several complaints, the City reinstalled
the berm, but this failed to control water runoff during heavy rains.
The removal of the berm created a tension crack that extended 40 feet
east, across the south end of 38" Street and onto the plaintiffs
property. The City did not act to remedy the situation. In early April
1991, water pressure in the tension crack caused a landslide, which
destroyed a portion of the plaintiffs property. A landslide and
hydrology expert opined that the City could have prevented the severe
damage if it acted sooner and that the impermeable nature of the
street caused the collection of the surface waters.
The plaintiff asserted three theories for the City's liability. First,
Plaintiff claimed that the City failed to maintain its prescriptive
easement.
Second, Plaintiff asserted the street collected and
channeled surface waters in a manner different than the natural flow
of the water thrust onto the property of the plaintiff causing damage to
her property. Third, Plaintiff averred that she was entitled to inverse
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condemnation because the City failed to use reasonable care to keep
its streets safe for adjacent landowners and that failure created a
nuisance, a taking, and a trespass. The City denied liability and
alleged that the developer who filled the ravine should be apportioned
liability. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment on all of her claims except inverse condemnation. The
court of appeals reversed and dismissed Plaintiffs suit. It held that a
municipality could not be liable for damages caused by surface waters
that could not percolate into the ground due to the impermeable
surface of the street. It also held that the City did not thrust the
surface waters onto the plaintiffs property; therefore, the City
maintained its prescriptive easement. Finally, the court of appeals
held that a municipality's duty to use reasonable care only extended to
the travelling public, not to adjacent landowners.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The
court addressed three points. First, the court reversed the court of
appeals holding of municipal liability in general. The supreme court
held that a municipality may be liable for damages caused by a street
that collected, channeled, and thrust surface waters onto the property
of an adjoining landowner, in a manner different from the natural
course.
Next, the supreme court addressed the specific issue of the City's
liability for 38h Street. The court held that, generally, a municipality
may be liable for damages, but it remanded on the question of
whether 38' h Street specifically collected, channeled, and thrust surface
waters onto the plaintiffs property.
Finally, the supreme court addressed the issue of the municipality's
duty to use reasonable care in maintaining the streets for adjacent
landowners as well as for travelers on the street. The court hesitated to
create a new duty to adjacent landowners. The court feared the risk of
unlimited liability and innumerable lawsuits against municipalities if it
extended the municipality's duty to adjacent landowners. The court
held that a duty of care to adjacent landowners and travelers created
too broad a category of liability for municipalities.
The concurring opinion agreed that the City was not liable to the
plaintiff for negligence. The opinion also stated that the majority's
opinion had not changed the surface water law in Washington.
Generally, municipalities are not liable to adjacent landowners for
runoff on roads caused by grading or pavement of the roads. Liability
arises only if the manner or amount of flow changes and causes
damage.

Sheela S. Parameswar
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WISCONSIN
Gillen v. City of Neenah, 580 N.W. 2d 628 (Wis. 1998) (holding that:
(1) the specific procedures for injunction took precedence over the
general procedures requiring notice of claims against a governmental
body; and (2) a citizen asserting a violation of the public trust doctrine
may directly sue a private party).
In 1952, the legislature granted the rights to land near the south
shore of Little Lake des Morts to the City of Neenah ("City"). The City
was obligated to hold these lands in public trust for the benefit of all
citizens. In 1951, continuing to 1975, Bergstrom Paper Company
("Bergstrom"), the predecessor to P.H. Glatfelter Company
("Glatfelter"), placed sludge material in the grant area. Furthermore,
in 1951, 1974, and 1984, the city leased a portion of the grant area to
Bergstrom and Glatfelter Companies for construction and operation
of a wastewater treatment plant.
In 1995, Minergy Corporation ("Minergy") sought a lease from the
City to construct and operate a commercial facility for paper sludge
processing on a different part of the grant area. The Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR"), City, Glatfelter and Minergy entered a
settlement agreement. As part of this agreement DNR agreed not to
pursue enforcement action under its public trust authority. Thereafter
Minergy and the City entered into a lease authorizing commencement
of Minergy's proposed facility. The City conducted public meetings
and finally the facility was approved. The DNR subsequently issued a
final air pollution control permit and indicated that an environmental
impact statement would not be necessary.
The plaintiffs, environmental activists, initiated suit in the circuit
court as individuals, "and in the name of the State of Wisconsin,"
challenging the Minergy lease and the actions of Glatfelter. The
plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against the construction of
the Minergy facility. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
and they appealed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court heard the case
upon certification from the court of appeals.
The supreme court first addressed the issue of whether the
plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of claim against the City barred their
action against the City. The court determined that there were two
statutes in conflict. One statute required notice before an action
against a governmental entity and the other specifically provided for
injunctive relief. The supreme court held, "[w]here general and
specific statutory provisions are in conflict, the specific provisions take
precedence" and therefore, the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the
notice obligation did not bar their claims.
The supreme court then addressed the issue of whether the public
trust doctrine allowed a citizen to directly sue a private party. The
court held the public trust doctrine, "establishes standing for the state,
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or any person suing in the name of the state for the purpose of
vindicating the public trust to assert a cause of action recognized by
the existing law of Wisconsin." The court then examined the history
and text of the Wisconsin statute providing for actions by citizens for
abatement of public nuisances (plaintiffs claimed the proposed
Minergy development was a public nuisance). The court found no
basis in the history or text to prevent the plaintiffs' standing. The
court held the plaintiffs' claims could therefore go forward.
The concurring opinion agreed that the plaintiffs' failure to file a
notice of claim with the City did not bar their claims. However, the
concurring opinion criticized the per curium opinion stating the
"holding and rationale ... do not apply to the facts of the case ......

The court's unpredictable applications of the notice of claim
requirement, "leaves attorneys and courts guessing about when a
notice of claim must be filed and calls into question the status of cases
now pending or already decided by the courts."
ChristineWise-Ludban

Turkow v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 576 N.W. 2d 288
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the agency has authority over
navigability determinations and that the proper avenue for a challenge
to agency action is through § 227 of the Wisconsin Statutes, not
through a declaratory judgment motion).
In 1942, the construction of Big Lake Road created an artificial
outlet ("the stream") of Big Lake. In 1957, the Public Service
Commission ("PSC") found that the stream was not navigable. After
the PSC finding, Lawrence Turkow purchased the property that
contained the stream. A walkway and a metal fence blocked the
stream at the time he purchased the property.
Mr. Turkow
subsequently erected another walkway that also obstructed the stream.
In 1989, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR")
received complaints from citizens regarding the walkways and the
fence. These obstructions prevented anyone from traveling down the
stream. The DNR investigated and found that the stream was
navigable. After additional complaints from citizens, the DNR wrote to
Turkow advising him as to their finding of navigability. It ordered him
to remove the obstructions within forty-five days or face citation. In
response to the DNR's action, Mr. Turkow filed a complaint against
the agency and both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff based
on his declaratory judgment action. The trial court found that the
DNR lacked jurisdiction due to the PSC's finding of non-navigability.
The trial court precluded the DNR's authority and equitably estopped
the agency from finding that the stream was navigable. The DNR
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appealed this decision. The main issues in the case were whether the
DNR had authority to determine that the stream was navigable and
whether a challenge to agency action not pursuant to § 227 of the
Wisconsin Statutes was valid.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the trial court
improperly concluded that the DNR was estopped from reconsidering
the navigability of the stream. The Court of Appeals also reversed the
declaratory judgment action stating that it was barred by principles of
sovereign immunity and specific remedies for agency action found in §
227. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in not
granting the DNR's motion to dismiss based on the improper method
of remedy sought by the plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that § 31.02 of the Wisconsin
Statutes entrusted the DNR with the regulation of navigable streams.
This section also gave the DNR the authority to make navigability
determinations. The court found that equitable estoppel did not
apply because the DNR had authority for its navigability
determination. The court established that the PSC's finding was
irrelevant under the circumstances. The court also reasoned that a
declaratory judgment was inappropriate because it bypassed the
exclusive means of administrative review set forth in the Wisconsin
Statutes. A plaintiff cannot circumvent the review provided therein.
The appellate court also confirmed that the principle of state
sovereign immunity extended to state agencies. Thus, an action
against the agency entailed only those remedies found in § 227. This
section provides for both administrative and judicial review of agency
action. Mr. Turkow did not pursue any action pursuant to § 227.
Based on this reasoning, the trial court improperly denied the DNR's
motion to dismiss. The DNR had the authority and jurisdiction for the
navigability decision it made regarding the stream.
A proper
challenge to agency action must go through the proper channels and
since Mr. Turkow ignored this principle, his action lacked standing.

Kristen L. Cassisa

